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Article 4

NOTES AND COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA POWER
The Secretary of Labor, suspecting a violation of wage standards
set up under the Walsh-Healey Act,1 issued two subpoenas duces tecum
ordering production of appelant's payroll records.2 Appellant refused
to comply, saying that many of its employees were not working in
the furtherance of government contracts and hence as to them, the
act did not apply. 3 Upon application to the district court,4 appellant
was found to be outside the scope of the act and the court refused to
enforce the order.5 The Circuit Court of Appeals reversedO and petition for certiorari was taken to the Supreme Court. Held, for appellant.
The determination of jurisdiction under the act is the exclusive function
of the Secretary of Labor and not a question for the court to consider.
Endicott Johnson Corp. et al. v. Perkins, - U.S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 339
(1942), Justices Murphy and Roberts dissenting.
Delegation of the subpoena power to administrative agencies has
1.

2.

49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1941). This act gives
the Secretary of Labor the power to establish certain minimum
wage standards (§35 (b)), and prescribes the number of working
hours (§35(c)) for employees engaged in manufacturing for
government contracts in excess of $10,000.
41 U.S.C. §38 ("The Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized to
administer the provisions of this act. .

.

. The Secretary of Labor

shall have the power to make investigations and findings
and prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in

any part of the United States."); §39 (" . . . the Secretary of
Labor . . . shall have the power to hold hearings and to issue

orders requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
the production of evidence under oath.")
3. The appellant's government contracts were for the manufacturing of shoes. Some of its plants, while not manufacturing
finished shoes, were making component parts of shoes such as
heels, soles, counters, etc. Appellant says the act does not apply
to these plants because they are not making shoes.
4. 41 U.S.C. §39 ("In case of . . . refusal of any person to obey
such an order [supra, note 2], any district court . . . within

which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which
said person who is guilty of . . . refusal is found, or resides,

or transacts business, upon the application of the Secretary of

Labor . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an
order requiring such person to appear, . . . to produce evidence,
• . . and to give testimony relating to the matter . . . and any

failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said
court as a contempt thereof . . . ")

5.
6.

Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp. et al., 37 F. Supp. 604 (N.D.
N.Y. 1941).
Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp. et al., 128 F. (2d) 208 (C.C.A.
2d, 1942); see Judicial Review of the Administrative Exercise of
the Subpoena Power (1942) 52 Yale L. J. 175 for an exhaustive
treatment of the ruling of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
(231)
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been approved by the courts, 7 but if the administrative subpoena is
disregarded, there must be an application to the courts to compel
compliance8
In considering applications courts have enforced the subpoenas,
subject to certain constitutional limitations as to search and seizure.
However, the constitutional attack has been displaced in the later decisions by the jurisdictional approach.O Whether jurisdiction should
be considered by the court under a statute giving an administrative
body the power to issue a subpoena has given rise to much confusion.
The conventional attitude seems to have been to consider it as an additional avenue for judicial supervision of administrative activities."
7. 1 corn Baur, Federal Administrative Law (1942) 74; Willis, Comstitutional Law (1986) 536.
8. e.g. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15
U.S.C. §49 (1941); Walsh-Healey Act, 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), 41
U.S.C. §39 (1941).
9. Since the ones to whom subpoenas duces tecum are directed in
these cases are corporations, there is no immunity on the basis
of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. A corporation however, is entitled to protection under the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure of
its papers. Jones v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 298 U.S. 1
(1936); Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S.
298 (1924); Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc., et al. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920); Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 237 U.S.
434 (1915) (Justice Holmes brands broad subpoenas as "a fishing
expedition into the affairs of a stranger for the chance that
something discreditable might turn up"); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361 (1911). "A subpoena duces decum . . . may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. It is such if it is
too broad and sweeping in its terms . . . ". Rottschaefer, Handbook of American Constitutional Law (1939) 746; "If the subpoena . . . is too broad, it becomes a general warrant or writ
of assistance of the type that so inflamed colonial America ...
If the subpoena duces tecum . . . does not specify [the material]
satisfactorilly, it is . . . unreasonable." Hart, Introduction to
Administrative Law (1940) 216.
10. Electric Bond and Share Co. et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Comm., 303 U.S. 419 (1938); United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); General Tobacco & Grocery
Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. (2d) 596 (C.C.A. 6th., 1942); see Willis,
Constitutional Law (1936) 533 and Unreasonable Searches and
Seizures (1929) 4 Ind. L. J. 211, 313 pointing out the awkwardness
of the relation of subpoena duces tecum to the constitutional
guarantee.
11. Meyers et al. v. Bethlehem Ship Building Corp., 303 U.S. 41
(1938); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Shauffler
et al., 303 U.S. 54 (1938) (holding that the National Labor Relations Act does not vest in the Labor Board exclusive power to
determine its own jurisdiction); Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485 (1894) ("The inquiry whether a witness before a commission is bound to . . . produce books, papers,
etc. in his possession . . . is one that cannot be committed to a
subordinate administrative or executive tribunal for final determination"); General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125
F. (2d) 596, 599 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942) ("The seal of a United
States court should not become a mere rubber stamp for the
approval of arbitrary action by an administrative agency");
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It is argued that where resort to the judiciary is required by Congress, the court should be more than a mere rubber stamp; otherwise,
no application to the courts would have been required.12 While this
argument is logical, it fails to disclose the real reason behind the
requirement. Since administrative bodies have no power to punish
for contempt of its orders,s there would be no way in which they
could be enforced unless by a court having the power to punish for
contempt. Thus it would seem that reference to the judiciary is required merely for the purpose of securing enforcement through the
courts' contempt power rather than for the purpose of any inquiry
by the courts as to jurisdiction.
In view of the newness of administrative activity in this field
and the reluctance with which courts have approved of administrative
regulation generally,14 it would seem only natural that Congress, in
trying to stay within the bounds previously prescribed by courts regarding delegation of the dangerous subpoena power, should require
application to the courts for enforcement even though it be only a
formality incorporated into the legislation to provide a method of
enforcement and to appease the vestige of strict judicial supervision.15

12.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. et al. v. N.L.R.B., 122 F. (2d) 450
(C.C.A. 6th, 1941); Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Tung
Corp. of America et al. 32 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. ll. 1940). "These
determinations as to jurisdiction are said to be so basic that their
existence is a condition precedent to administrative action. Consequently, it has been held that where the administrative agency
makes a finding, regardless of whether it is purely factual or not,
which incidentally involves a determination of its jurisdiction
over a particular subject matter or transaction, that determination
must remain open to the independent judicial review by the trial
court." Blachly and Oatman, Federal Regulatory Action and
Control (1940) 124; Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons
and Property (1928) 293.
Mr. Justice Murphy, dissenting in the instant case, points out at
345 that "in conditioning enforcement of the Secretary's administrative subpoenas upon application to the district court, Congress evidently intended to keep the subpoena power within limits
and . . . must have meant for the courts to perform more than

a routine ministerial function in passing upon those applications.
If this were not the case, it would have been much simpler to
lodge the power of enforcement directly with the Secretary";
see General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F. (2d) 596
(C.C.A. 6th, 1942) supra, note 11.
13. California v. Lattimer et al., 305 U.S. 255 (1938); Federal Power
Comm. v. Metropolitan Edison Co. et al., 304 U.S. 375 (1938);
Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 483, 31 N.E. 190, 194 (1891)
(holding that only the courts and the General Assembly can
punish for contempt, and the power to do so can not be conferred
upon any other official or board of officials [State Board of Tax
Commissioners]); In re Whitcomb, 120 Mass. 118, 21 Am. Rep.
502 (1876) (city council). 2 vom Baur, Federal Administrative
Law (1942) 599.
14. Pound, Administrative Law (1942) 27; Freund, The Growth of
American Administrative Law (1923) 10.
15. "With the legislation still novel, its requirements may seem somewhat outlandish. Increased familiarity will further reveal the
potentialities of this type control." Handler, Constitutionality
of Investigations (1928) 28 Col. L. R. 905, 937. "If in the en-
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It seems certain now that most administrative agencies' findings
of fact are conclusive so long as supported by some evidence.16 Conceding this, it seems logical for the courts to recognize, as some have
done,1 7 that the power conferred by statute does not confer on the
court authority to consider the jurisdiction or "coverage" of the act.
Indeed, the facts determining coverage are often unavailable at the
time the subpoena is issued and hence, there is no evidence upon
which the court can judge the applicability of the act at that stage of
the proceedings1s
forcement suit the court makes extensive inquiry, it defeats
the restraints otherwise imposed upon interlocutory appeals
from agencies' orders." Judicial Review of the Administrative
Exercise of the Subpoena Power (1942) 52 Yale L.J. 175, 176.
16. Gray et al. v. Powell et al., 314 U.S. 402 (1941); Meyers et al. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Securities and
Exchange Comm. v. Tung Corp of America et al., 32 F. Supp.
371 (N.D. Ill. 1940). Blachly and Oatman, Federal Regulatory
Action and Control (1940) 122; Rottschaefer, Hand Book of
American Constitutional Law (1939) 844.
17. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Fleming, 122 F. (2d) 1005, 1008 (C.C.A. 8th,
1941) ("Administrative functions and relationships are no concern of the judiciary unless fundamental rights are being violated
or unless the statute has imposed a specific duty on the courts
with respect to them") rev'd on other grounds, 315 U.S. 357 (1942) ;
Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F. (2d) 384, 390 (C.C.A.
7th, 1940)

("When Congress . . . has the power to regulate and

supervise the conduct of any particular business under the commerce clause, an administrative agency may be authorized to
inspect books and records . . . regardless of whether . . . there

is any pre-existing probable cause for believing that there has
been a violation of the law"), cert. den. 311 U.S. 690 (1940); In
re Standard Dredging Corp., 44 F. Supp. 601, 602 (S.D. N.Y.,
1942) ("The [Wage and Hour] administrator is not obliged as a
condition of obtaining an enforcement order of his subpoena to
make any showing that the respondents are engaged in commerce"); Fleming v. G. & C. Novelty Shoppe, 35 F. Supp. 829
(N.D. Ill., 1940); cf. Graham v. Federal Tender Board, 118 F.
(2d) 8 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941); President of the United States v.
Skeen, 118 F. (2d) 58, 59 (C.C.A. 5th, 1941) ("The officers [of
the Federal Tender Board] would not be bound by the denial
of any person operating in the field that he was engaged in
interstate commerce"); National Mediation Board v. Virginian
Ry., 2 Pike and Fischer, Adm. Law Serv. §§44g.31-4 (1941) ("The
board has authority to examine the records of the railway and
ascertain who are the employees in a particular class").
18. Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F. (2d) 384 (C.C.A.
7th, 1940) supra, note 17. Judge Treanor says at 392 that there
is no restraint upon the use of a subpoena duces tecum which
limits its use to cases where the subpoenaed property is the sole
source of information.

ATTORNEYS
POWER OF THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT TO DISBAR
Defendant attorney, a member of the Indiana bar, brought an
action in the state Supreme Court. In considering that case, certain
matters arose which the Court directed the Attorney-General to investi-

